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The Pakistan Development Review 
Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 1988) 
Export-promoting Protection: Endogenous 
Monopoly and Price Disparity 
Jagdish Bhagwati* 
This note shows that protection-induced export promotion can arise even in 
the absence of economies of scale, which have been long analysed as factors sliding 
an import-substituting industry up the scale of comparative advantage and turning 
it into an exporter eventually. Even with an upward -eloping marginal-cost curve, a 
domestic monopolist can be protected and could then charge discriminatory 
prices in domestic and export markets, thus becoming an exporter whereas free 
trade would have destroyed the monopoly and led to imports instead. 
INTRODUCTION 
That an industry, once protected, may slide up the scale of comparative 
advantage and become eventually an exporter is not a novelty. This sequence, when 
it occurs, is likely to reflect a successful maturing of an infant industry, though any- 
one familiar with the scope of interventions in the form of direct and indirect export 
subsidies in certain countries may be forgiven for not immediately jumping to the 
conclusion that this sequence, described by Japanese economist Akamatsu as the 
"flying eese pattern", is a result simply of the operation of market forces reflecting 
the industry's having attained to successful adulthood. 
But can protection improve xport performance even if we were to rule out 
learning and other dynamic externalities that may turn an import-substitute into an 
export activity eventually? The answer is in the affirmative if we deploy a model in 
which protection, invoked in the presence of domestic monopoly, permits price 
discrimination between domestic and foreign markets. This is demonstrated in 
•The author is Arthur Lehman, Professor of Economics and Professor of Political Science 
at Columbia University, N.Y. (USA), from where he is currently on leave for an assignment at the 
World Bank (for 1986-87). The substance of this note though perhaps understood intuitively by 
many analysts of trade regimes in the developing countries, does not appear to have been devel- 
oped rigorously anywhere. The immediate motivation for writing the note was provided by the 
author's learning from Professor Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, on a visit to the Pakistan Institute of 
Development Economics in 1985 , that a survey of export industries had found that export prices 
were often below domestic prices in several activities which were protected by the trade regime 
from import protection at the same time. Comments by Sam Laird, Patrick Messerlin and 
Richard Pomfret have been helpful. 
The views expressed herein are those of the author and should not be attributed to the 
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2 Jagdish Bhagwati 
Section I, where it is shown that the protection-induced xport promotion will be 
characterized by a "price disparity": the domestic price will exceed the export price. 
Such price disparity is indeed observed in several developing countries which use 
prohibitive or nearly prohibitive tariffs or QRs on imports of items that are exported. 
Section II then shows that if a protective duty, explicit or implicit, is matched 
by an export subsidy (as is roughly done in countries that practise the export- 
promoting EP trade strategy),1 the price disparity will be accompanied by a yet 
further expansion of exports. 
Section III offers concluding observations. 
SECTION I 
Conventional Thesis 
The conventional wisdom, critical of the impact of protection on exports, is 
reflected in Figure 1 . The model in it is of the familiar partial-equilibrium variety. 
SF (ARp = MRp) represents the infinitely elastic foreign-supply curve with con- 
stant average and marginal revenues. ARD and MRj^ are the domestic average- and 
marginal-revenue curves. The domestic monopolist's marginal-cost curve is MC. 
PRICE i > 
COST 
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Figure 1. 
^ee Bhagwati (1978) and Chapter 8 in (1986) for a definition and analysis of the EP 
strategy. 
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If there is free trade, the monopolist's monopoly is eliminated by foreign 
competition. In this case, the monopolist produces AB while BD is the level of free- 
trade imports, Mf . 
Now let a tariff be imposed at rate t, so that OE = OA (1+t). The domestic 
monopolist can then charge domestic price OE while producing AC (at c, his margin- 
al cost equals marginal revenue in domestic sale) for domestic consumption. 
Thus, relative to free trade, protection increases domestic production (from 
AB to AC), raises domestic price (from OA to OE), and diminishes imports (from 
BD to zero). 
This configuration is probably what is widely understood to be the effect of 
protection in the presence of domestic monopolies which, while exogenous in origin, 
are endogenous to the trade policy itself. It is not surprising, therefore, for econ- 
omists to believe that, even in the presence of monopoly, protection will have an 
adverse impact on trade, exactly as it does in conventional competitive arguments. 
Alternative Thesis 
Consider, however, the different configuration of prices and costs in Figure 2.2 
In free trade, the domestic monopolist loses his monopoly and produces AC 
(at C, his marginal cost equals marginal revenue), domestic price is OA, and domestic 
PRICE ^ 
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Figure 2. 
2 Ignore s, the export subsidy in Figure 2 until the next section, i.e. ignore X , H and G. 
This content downloaded  on Thu, 24 Jan 2013 15:35:53 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
4 Jagdish Bhagwati 
demand is AD. CD represents, therefore, the attendant imports under free trade, 
Mf. 
Replace free trade now by a tariff at rate t. The domestic price then will be 
OE, with the import supply curve, Sp, now turning into Sp (1+t). At price OE, the 
domestic monopolist can- successfully maximize his profits by producing AB for the 
domestic market and charging OE for it, selling ВС for export at price OA instead, 
and using the import tariff at rate t to prevent arbitrage and to facilitate the market 
segmentation that permits this price discrimination between the home market and 
the foreign market. 
Thus, protection-induced exports, Xt, contrast with free-trade-induced imports, 
Mf. Evidently, by facilitating price discrimination, protection has led to export 
promotion. 
It is important to note that this remarkable result has nothing to do with 
economies of scale (the marginal-cost curve is upward -sloping), externalities, or ex- 
port subsidies. It is an elementary result of protection interacting with domestic 
monopoly to create price discrimination. 
However, where Figure 1 produces the orthodox result, Figure 2 produces the 
protection-induced export -enhancement paradox. The reason is manifest in the 
behaviour of marginal cost. In the former case, the marginal costs being high relative 
to foreign price, protection simply shuts off imports. In the latter case, where the 
marginal costs are more favourable relative to foreign price, protection permits the 
domestic monopolist to exploit price discrimination between foreign and domestic 
markets and opens up the possibility of protection carrying import substitution over 
into export performance!3 
SECTION II 
Suppose next that the country, having protected the domestic monopolist, 
gives a matching export subsidy so that the relative incentives (effective exchange 
rates, in the trade-and-developments literature) between exporting and import- 
substitution are equal rather than biased against exports. 
3I should note that the analysis in Figure 2 of price discrimination is in itself not original. 
In fact, standard textbooks on international economics have often incorporated it, to illustrate 
price discrimination in international trade by a monopolist, wholly following Joan Robinson's 
classic analysis of the problem and simply and implicitly assuming that somehow the domestic 
and foreign markets can be delinked. What is new is twofold: (i) linking protection to imports 
as the key policy that enables the monopolist to preserve his monopoly and simultaneously to 
delink the foreign and domestic markets so that price discrimination becomes possible; and 
(ii) demonstrating that, compared with the free-trade case, the protection-induced price discrimi- 
nation leads to export promotion. Richard Pomfret has pointed out to me that point (i) has been 
made earlier by Basevi (1970), though in the context of exploitation of scale economies. See also 
the important early article by Pomfret (1975), which also anticipates the later, interesting article 
by Paul Krugman (1984) in demonstrating that scale economies can make a tariff lead to export 
promotion. 
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Export-promoting Protection $ 
In this event, in Figure 2, the export incentive at rate s = t is also reflected by 
SF(1 +t) rather than by Sp. Then, equilibrium production by the domestic monop- 
olist shifts to EG, with EF produced for the home market and FG sold as export 
(Xs_t).4 Protection helps export performance; matching subsidization helps it yet 
further. 
SECTION III 
But while these results are interesting and match the observed reality in several 
cases, the reader must be warned that they do not imply that protection is good. 
Indeed, by sustaining domestic monopoly, such protection will be contributing more 
losses tò the usual deadweight loss from protection. 
Moreover, note that the case analysed in the text is likely to apply particularly 
to countries (such as India) where the creation of domestic monopoly is buttressed 
by restrictions on domestic entry through investment licensing. By contrast, in 
countries of the Far East, it appears that domestic entry is much easier and hence 
domestic monopoly is often not a suitable assumption to make. 
Finally, the presence of price disparity in itself need not be explained in terms 
of the price-discrimination model. Thus, for instance, an observed price disparity, 
such that the export price is below the domestic price, may simply reflect he phen- 
omenon of under-invoiced exports. Such under unvoicing can be a consequence of 
high export duties that exceed the black-market premium on foreign exchange 
(Bhagwati, 1964). 
4 Any domestic sale less than EF would mean that the domestic price would exceed OE, 
which is impossible under the stated assumptions. 
REFERENCES 
Basevi, Giorgio (1970). "Domestic Demand and Ability to Export". Journal of 
Political Economy. Vol.78, pp. 330-337. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1964). "On the Underinvoicing of Imports". Bulletin of the 
Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 26. pp. 389-397. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1978). The Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control 
Regimes. Cambridge, Massachusetts: NBER, Ballinger & Co. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1986). Export Promoting Trade Strategy: Issues and Evidence. 
World Bank, VPERS Working Papers (Memeographed). Forthcoming in World 
Bank Research Observer. January 1988. 
Krugman, Paul (1984). "Import Protection as Export Promotion". In Henryk 
Kierzkowski (ed.), Monopolistic Competition and International Trade. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Pomfret, Richard (1975). "Some Interrelationships between Import Substitution 
and Export Promotion in a Small Economy". Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. Band 
III, Heft 4. pp. 714-727. 
This content downloaded  on Thu, 24 Jan 2013 15:35:53 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
